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Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Multi-Winner Elections   
摘  要:   Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, no specific attention has previously been devoted to elections with multiple winners, e.g., elections of an assembly or committee. In this paper, we characterize the worst-case complexity of manipulation and control in the context of four prominent multi- winner voting systems, under different formulations of the strategic agent's goal.
发  表:   Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research  2008

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