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The Cost of Stability and Its Application to Weighted Voting Games   
摘  要:   A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional sta- bility, usually captured by the notion of the core—the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of stabilizin ...
发  表:   Computing Research Repository  2009

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