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Reshef Meir 的论文(19) 排序方式:
Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Multi-Winner Elections  
Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, no specific attention has previously been devoted to elections with multiple winners, e.g., elections......
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research  2008
22次引用 0 0
The Cost of Stability in Network Flow Games  
The core of a cooperative game contains all stable distributions of a coalition's gains among its members. However, some games have an empty core, with every distribution being unstable. We allow an e......
Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science  2009
7次引用 0 0
Strategyproof Classification under Constant Hypotheses: A Tale of Two Functions  
We consider the following setting: a decision maker must make a decision based on reported data points with binary labels. Subsets of data points are controlled by different selfish agents, which migh......
National Conference on Artificial Intelligence  2008
7次引用 0 0
The Cost of Stability and Its Application to Weighted Voting Games  
A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional sta- bility, usually captured by the notion of the core—the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviat......
Computing Research Repository  2009
6次引用 0 0
Strategyproof Classification with Shared Inputs  
Strategyproof classification deals with a setting where a decision-maker must classify a set of input points with binary labels, while minimizing the expected error. The labels of the input points are......
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence  2009
6次引用 0 0
A broader picture of the complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections  
Recent work by Procaccia, Rosenschein and Zohar [14] established some results regarding the complexity of manipulation and control in elections with multiple winners, such as elections of an assembly ......
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems/Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages  2008
4次引用 0 0
The cost of stability in weighted voting games  
One key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability. A coalition in such games is stable when no subset of the agents in it has a rational incentive to leave the coalition. Fi......
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems/Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages  2009
3次引用 0 0
On the Limits of Dictatorial Classification  
In the strategyproof classification setting, a set of labeled examples is partitioned among multiple agents. Given the reported labels, an optimal classification mechanism returns a classifier that mi......
 2010
3次引用 0 0
On the limits of dictatorial classification  
In the strategyproof classification setting, a set of labeled examples is partitioned among multiple agents. Given the reported labels, an optimal classification mechanism returns a classifier that mi......
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems/Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages  2010
2次引用 0 0
Coalitional Structure Generation in Skill Games  
We consider optimizing the coalition structure in Coalitional Skill Games (CSGs), a succinct representation of coalitional games (Bachrach and Rosenschein 2008). In CSGs, the value of a coalition depe......
National Conference on Artificial Intelligence  2010
2次引用 0 0

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